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Abstract. - Vulnerabilities related to weak passwords are a pressing global economic and security
issue. We report a novel, simple, and effective approach to address the weak password problem.
Building upon chaotic dynamics, criticality at phase transitions, CAPTCHA recognition, and
computational round-off errors we design an algorithm that strengthens security of passwords.
The core idea of our simple method is to split a long and secure password into two components.
The first component is memorized by the user. The second component is transformed into a
CAPTCHA image and then protected using evolution of a two-dimensional dynamical system
close to a phase transition, in such a way that standard brute-force attacks become ineffective.
We expect our approach to have wide applications for authentication and encryption technologies.
Introduction. – Computer and information security
has been subject to intensive research for over 50 years.
This included investigation of cryptographic methods, as
well as generic security of computing devices, operating
systems and networks. However, it is only relatively
recently that the importance of the human factor has
been given proper attention. Passwords are the common
method for authentication and encryption used to secure
digital life. Humans have limited capacity to remember
passwords and tend to select passwords that are too sim-
ple and predictable. Security breaches related to weak
passwords are widespread events. Consumers and enter-
prises around the world are looking for ways to address the
weak password problem [1, 2]. In this paper we propose
a simple method to address the problem by combining
chaotic dynamics, phase transitions, and pattern recogni-
tion advantages of the human brain. We do not design a
new encryption scheme. Instead we use standard encryp-
tion tschemes, and add a littel overhead on top in order to
substantially enhance security. A major building block of
the proposed algorithm is the dynamic behavior of com-
plex extended non-linear systems, in particular, Hamilto-
nian lattices close to a phase transition [3, 4]. These sys-
tems display non-ergodicity, deterministic chaos [5], and
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spontaneous formation of coherent space-time structures.
Building upon dynamical chaos and computational round-
off errors and utilizing superiority of the human brain
over computers with respect to pattern recognition, our
method protects a secret token, which can be used, in
combination with a regular password, to derive a secret
key for data encryption.
It was estimated in 2009 that 86% of US companies
use password authentication and encryption [6]. A weak
password used with a strong encryption or authentica-
tion algorithm potentially makes a computer system vul-
nerable to brute-force password search attacks. Studies
have shown that users will generally address the password
complexity problem by using simple predictable pass-
words [7, 8]. Schneier examined 34,000 MySpace online
passwords and concluded that 65% of them contained 8
characters, with most frequently used passwords being
“password1”, “abc123”, “myspace1”, and “password” [8].
Other user strategies include using the same password for
every account, writing down passwords, storing passwords
in files, and reusing or recycling old passwords. Horowitz
reported that 15-20% of the users on a regular basis wrote
down their password on a Post-it note attached to the
computer monitor [8]. Another study found that 66% of
users keep password paper records at work and 58% keep
passwords in files [8].
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Vulnerabilities related to weak passwords have signifi-
cant economic effect globally. Results of a recent study
[8,9] revealed that identity fraud affects nearly 5% of con-
sumers, or nearly 10 million people in the USA per year.
The total annual cost of identity fraud in the United States
was more than $55 billion in 2006 [9]. Vulnerabilities re-
lated to weak passwords have significant economic effect
globally.
Cryptographic science utilizes discrete reversible func-
tions that operate on bit strings and take a secret key
as a parameter. As an example, Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [10] specifies an encryption function ap-
proved for use by the US government. AES encrypts data
in input/output blocks of 128 bits. The secret key lengths
supported by AES are 128, 192, and 256 bits. These long
key lengths were selected to make brute-force attacks in-
feasible.
Over the years, a number of more sophisticated crypt-
analysis attacks were described for various cryptographic
algorithms. Such attacks are usually very technical and
algorithm-specific and rely on finding statistical correla-
tions in the cryptographic function to extract information
on the cryptographic key. However, an ideal cryptographic
function depends on its inputs in a completely random way
with no correlations present. Therefore, a brute search
attack remains the essential attack used in real world to
compromise cryptographic algorithms.
For a completely random secret key used with the AES
algorithm, a brute-force attack is presently infeasible and
will probably remain so in the future. The situation
changes dramatically, when the key is limited to a smaller
subspace of keys. A common situation is that the key is
either a password, memorized by a human, or is derived
from a password using a function known to the attacker.
A brute search over a small subspace can then be done
efficiently.
A typical brute-force search attack requires that the at-
tacker is in possession of the encrypted text (Ciphertext)
C, and that the true key belongs to a subspace of keys S.
The attacker can mount a Ciphertext-Only Attack by iter-
ating through the space S and attempting to decrypt C in
each case into a Candidate Plain Text. Now the attacker
needs to determine whether it is the True Plain Text.
This Recognition Problem is, therefore, a necessary part of
Ciphertext-Only Attack, and amounts to designing an ef-
ficient algorithm denoted as the Recognition Oracle (RO).
Implementations of ROs make use of the block-encryption
structure, standard file formats, and correlations in True
Plain Text.
Proposed scheme. – We assume that a confidential
data file (D) is encrypted by a symmetric encryption algo-
rithm, such as AES. We also assume that the encryption
and decryption are done by the same person, therefore we
do not address vulnerabilities due to messenger capture at-
tacks when transmitting passwords. The encryption key
EK is a combination of a reasonable-strength password
component, which we denote as Short Password SP and
an additional Strong Key SK: EK=SP+SK. The differ-
ence between the proposed method and existing crypto-
graphic technologies is that the user is not asked to mem-
orize SK. Instead, the graphical representation of SK is
embedded into a two-dimensional Image of Strong Key
of a momentary initial state (IS) of a nonlinear Hamil-
tonian two-dimensional lattice system. This embedding
is similar to embeddings used in Completely Automated
Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart
(CAPTCHAs) [11–13], therefore, we also coin it password
CAPTCHA or p-CAPTCHA. A time evolution of the two-
dimensional lattice is then performed. The chaotic evolu-
tion transforms the p-CAPTCHA into a chaotic final lat-
tice state (FS). Since our Hamiltonian system is close to
a phase transition, this chaotic state will contain regular-
ities at various space scales, such as a domain structures.
Therefore the level of spatial correlations is the same both
for IS and FS. If one encodes lattice site positions and
velocities using floating point numbers, these regularities
will be manifested in the first half of the digits (the more-
significant bits) of such an encoding. The second half of
the digits (the less-significant bits) will have a pseudo-
random nature due to the dynamical chaos in the system.
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Fig. 1: Schematic flow of the encryption, decryption and attack
processes.
We split the state information of FS for each lattice site
into two files. File F1 contains all more-significant bits,
and file F2 contains all less-significant bits. We encrypt F2
using the password SP, memorized by the user and obtain
the encrypted file EF2. The scheme finally also encrypts
the data D using the encryption key EK and generates the
encrypted data file ED. We glue all three files together into
one resulting file EF=ED+F1+EF2.
To restore the data, EF is split into its three components
ED, F1 and EF2. The user is then asked to enter SP in
order to decrypt EF2 and to obtain F2. Files F1 and F2
yield the correct final state FS. It is evolved back in time to
the initial state IS. Its image is shown as a p-CAPTCHA.
The user is asked to read the characters and to type them
in. The obtained strong key SK is combined with the
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already provided SP into the encryption key EK. Finally
the encrypted data ED are decrypted into the original data
set D (see Fig.1).
Let us now assume that all three files ED, F1 and EF2
are available to the attacker.
To mount a brute-force attack the attacker will scan
through the password space of SP. For each password
the attacker will first try to decrypt EF2. Note that all
(wrong) candidates for a decrypted F2 file will have the
structure of a series of integers, therefore the attacker can
not distinguish wrong from right by checking their struc-
ture. The attacker can now use such a candidate for F2,
obtain a candidate for the final state FS, integrate back-
wards, and generate a candidate for the initial state IS.
The corresponding image will a random set of domains
unless the correct SP was chosen initially. Since the dy-
namical system evolves at a fixed temperature close to
a phase transition, correlations of random domain wall
images and the p-CAPTCHA image are similar. The at-
tacker is left with the option to run an image recognition
program over the candidate image. This takes 1-10 sec-
onds (see discussion below) per recognition. Therefore,
computer-based Recognition Oracles will not be efficient
(see Fig.1).
Implementation. – In order to implement the strat-
egy described above, we consider a two-dimensional square
lattice of N×N coupled double-well oscillators depicted in
Fig.2, which is described by the Hamiltonian
H =
N∑
i,j=1
(
1
2
p2ij −
1
2
u2ij +
1
4
u4ij +
1
4
+ Fij
)
,
Fij =
∑
k=±1
1
4
[
(ui+k,j − uij)2 + (ui,j+k − uij)2
]
. (1)
The lattice indices i, j correspond to the two directions
for the square lattice. The equations of motion read
u˙ij = ∂H/∂pij , p˙ij = −∂H/∂uij and are invariant un-
der time reversal. We use N = 69 and perform time
evolution of the system using the symplectic Verlet al-
gorithm [14]. The time step for the numeric integration
is h = 0.01, and double precision is used. The system (1)
served as a simple model for structural phase transitions
e.g. in ferroelectric materials as BaTiO3 and also SrTiO3
[15]. The phase transition is of the second order [16] at a
certain critical value of the energy density which can be
set roughly equal to the average temperature T . At high
temperatures the oscillators traverse the potential barrier
easily, therefore, the average polarization order parame-
ter M = 1N2
∣∣∣∑ij sign(uij)∣∣∣ is zero for large N . For low
temperatures the energy of each oscillator is not sufficient
to overcome the potential barrier, and the interaction be-
tween oscillators enforces an ordered phase with M 6= 0.
The temperature dependence of M is shown in Fig. 3. The
phase transition point is Tc ≈ 1.
The evolution of system (1) in the vicinity of the transi-
tion point is characterized by a spatial correlation length
Fig. 2: The two-dimensional square lattice of coupled double-
well oscillators described by Eq.(1). The springs indicate the
nearest neighbour interactions. The double-well onsite po-
tential for each oscillator includes two equilibrium positions
uij = ±1.
which diverges exactly at the phase transition point. Close
to the phase transition large clusters of the low tempera-
ture phase emerge and disappear spontaneously. To ini-
tialize the system, we assign random values to the mo-
menta pij such that the kinetic energies p
2
ij/2 are dis-
tributed according to a Boltzmann distribution βe−βp
2/2
with a temperature T ≡ β−1 = 0.9 (red circle in Fig.3)
and coordinates uij = 1. We then integrate the equa-
tions of motion up to a time of the order of 200 time units
(t.u.) at which all temporal correlations decay. The image
of the thermalized local order parameter density distribu-
tion (the signs of the oscillator coordinates) is shown in
Fig. 4.
After that we imprint the SK (here the word “CHAOS”)
into the system and obtain the ISK or p-CAPTCHA
(see Fig. 5 and left top image “ISK/RESTORED ISK”
in Fig.6). The imprinting is done by using standard
masks for deformed yet clearly visible keyboard charac-
ters. These masks are placed on the lattice, and the signs
of all oscillator displacements inside such a mask area are
set to ’+’, while keeping the absolute values of the dis-
placements. The temperature is not affected by this oper-
ation.
In order to protect SK, we integrate the equations of mo-
tion further to some time τ (bottom-left image “MASKED
ISK” in Fig.6). Since the equations of motion are time
reversible, we can invert the integration, and expect to re-
gain the original state ISK after back integration over the
same time τ . This is particularly true for the Verlet dis-
cretization, which is also completely time reversible. How-
ever, the underlying dynamical system is non-integrable
and, therefore, chaotic [17]. Small perturbations will grow
exponentially fast as eλt where λ is the largest Lyapunov
exponent [17]. We also note that the numerical integration
algorithm, while being perfectly invertible in time, gen-
erates round-off errors (for double precision, at the 15th
digit after the point). These small errors will accumu-
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Fig. 3: Dependence of the order parameter M on the temper-
ature T for Eq.(1). The red circle at the bottom indicates the
operational point of the algorithm.
late exponentially fast in time. Therefore, there exists the
maximum loopback time τ∗ which still allows return to
ISK. For larger loopback times the image ISK is lost in
the high dimensional phase space of the system after the
loopback evolution is performed. We find that τ∗ ≈ 400
t.u.
Our strategy is then to choose τ to be close to τ∗. With
τ = 350 t.u. we can still integrate backwards and regain
the image ISK. The restored image is practically identical
to the original p-CAPTCHA we started with in Fig.5.
Slightest errors in the velocities and positions of the
oscillators will be amplified when integrating back, and
inhibit return to ISK. Indeed, we show this by slightly de-
tuning the coordinate of an oscillator in the final state
far from the original image location (right bottom im-
age “MASKED ISK WITH DETUNED SITE” in Fig.6):
u20,20 → u20,20 + 0.00001. Backward integration of the
corrupted state leads to a loss of the ISK (right top image
“NO ISK/RESTORING FAILED” in Fig.6).
Benchmarking. – Let us discuss estimates for the
security of the proposed algorithm. The knowledge of
the password SP allows the legitimate user to decrypt the
pseudo-random component and regain the correct state,
which is then integrated in the reverse time direction, lead-
ing to IS. The strong key SK together with the short pass-
word SP is now used in a combination as a secure secret
token to decrypt protected data.
Standard graphic cards - also called graphic processing
unit (GPU) - are used by hackers to speed up brute force
attacks. This is possible since GPUs contain few hundreds
of graphic processors (GP), as compared to one (some-
times two) central processing units (CPU) which are at the
heart of each computer. The difference is that GPs usu-
ally have only restricted memory as compared to CPUs,
yet this will be not of importance here. According to Hon-
eyball [19] a login password with five characters is brute
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Fig. 4: The thermalized state of Eq.(1) with parameters T =
0.9, N = 69 in the color coding of coordinates after forward
integration up to τ = 200 t.u.
force cracked within one second (GPU) compared to 24
seconds (CPU). Six character passwords need 4 seconds
(GPU) or 90 minutes (CPU). Seven characters yield 18
minutes (GPU) versus 4 days (CPU). Finally, nine char-
acters lead to 48 days (GPU) versus 43 years (CPU). The
speedup factor in using GPUs is therefore of the order
3 · 102 in most cases, corresponding to the number of GPs
on the GPU.
We assume that we have about 80 different choices
for one character in a given password. Short passwords
with length L will therefore span a space of 80L units.
Our scheme requires CAPTCHA recognition. Automatic
recognition programs need 1-10 seconds per image [?].
Therefore, choosing the same length of a password as be-
fore, a user will gain additional protection with the pre-
sented method as the additional time needed for the brute
force attack amounts to 80L/1000 seconds (note the the
factor 1000 is already assuming that all image recognition
programs can be parallelized on the GPU). With this said,
it is clear that our method gives additional security with
the same password length as used so far. However, we can
even reduce the SP length, still keeping a high level of se-
curity. For instance, a SP with L = 6 amounts to a brute
force attack with time 3000 years. Even a SP with length
L = 5 needs 38 days for a brute force attack to be success-
ful. To conclude these estimates, our scheme allows the
user to memorize a five character password but have the
protection of a standard nine character password, with
assuming that GPUs can be effectively used to perform
image recognition.
Outlook. – To conclude, we present an approach that
relates the fields of dynamical chaos, criticality, and pat-
tern recognition to cryptography. This approach allows us
to use the evolution of a chaotic Hamiltonian system near
a phase transition to embed and protect a secret token
that can subsequently be used for cryptographic purposes,
such as encryption of confidential data. Our method can
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Fig. 5: Initial ISK (p-CAPTCHA) of Eq.(1) with parameters
T = 0.9, N = 69 in color coding of coordinates. Note that the
restored image (after forward integration to τ = 350 t.u. and
backward integration to the origin) yields practically the same
image.
be readily and straightforwardly implemented on a wide
variety of existing computer systems and devices and, to
our view, provides a significant step forward in protection
of confidential data as compared to the currently available
methods of password-based encryption. We hope that our
findings can open a promising topic for future research.
Potential future directions include searching for optimal
Hamiltonian and non-Hamiltonian systems to be used as a
foundation for our method, optimizing the performance of
the method so that it can be executed on devices with low
computational power, as well as designing better image
embedding and evolution algorithms to provide stronger
protections against computer-based image recognition.
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